

1 **Does the performance of a flood early**
2 **warning system affect casualties and**
3 **economic losses? Empirical analysis using**
4 **open data from the 2018 Japan Floods**

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Abstract

18 Flood early warning systems are crucial for mitigating flood damage; how-
19 ever, limitations in forecasting technology lead to false alarms and missed
20 events in warnings. Repeated occurrences of these issues may cause people
21 to hesitate to take appropriate action during subsequent warnings, poten-
22 tially exacerbating flood damage. However, the effects of warning perfor-
23 mance on flood damage in Japan have not been analyzed for actual flood
24 events. This study empirically examined these effects by applying Bayesian
25 regression analyses to open data on the 2018 Japan Floods in 127 municipi-
26 palities in four prefectures (i.e., Okayama, Hiroshima, Ehime, and Fukuoka)
27 for which data were available on the real-time flood warning map (*Kouzui*
28 *Kikikuru* in Japanese) during the 2018 Japan Floods, which provides limited
29 open data on warning performance. Based on these data, the false alarm
30 ratio (FAR) and missed event ratio (MER) for each municipality before the
31 2018 Japan Floods were calculated and used as explanatory variables. The
32 (1) fatalities, (2) injuries, (3) economic losses to general assets, and (4) eco-
33 nomic losses to crops during the 2018 Japan Floods were used as outcome
34 variables. Models with and without prefecture-specific effects (prefecture
35 dummies) were considered. The results indicate that a higher FAR was

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36 associated with an increase in fatalities, injuries, and economic losses to
37 general assets in the models without prefecture dummies. However, these
38 effects were not clearly observed in models with prefecture dummies, which
39 performed better in terms of the information criterion in cases of injuries
40 and economic losses to general assets. Therefore, the effects of the FAR
41 on outcomes other than fatalities should be interpreted with caution. By
42 contrast, no prominent positive effect of MER was found for any outcome
43 variable in either model. These results provide valuable insights for improv-
44 ing warning systems.

45 **Keywords** False alarms; missed events; regression analyses; disaster statis-
46 tics; public response

47 **1. Introduction**

48 Weather forecasts and warnings offer promising solutions for reducing
49 weather-, climate-, and water-related disaster damage (Rogers and Tsirkunov
50 2011; Hallegatte 2012). Scientific and technological developments have in-
51 creased weather forecast skills over the past 40 years (Bauer, Thorpe &
52 Brunet, 2015). Accurate forecasts are expected to save lives, support emer-
53 gency management, mitigate impacts, and prevent economic losses due to
54 high-impact weather conditions. With human-induced climate change lead-
55 ing to more extreme weather conditions, the need for early warning systems
56 (EWS) has become increasingly crucial (World Meteorological Organiza-
57 tion, 2022).

58 However, owing to the limitations of scientific knowledge, observation
59 technology, and models, forecasts and warnings are not always accurate
60 (Trainor et al. 2015), which can lead to public complacency and under-
61 mine the effectiveness of an EWS. The performance of these systems is
62 often measured using the false alarm ratio (FAR) and the missed event ra-
63 tio (MER). False alarms refer to events that were forecasted to occur but
64 did not (Table 1), and FAR is calculated as the number of false alarms

65 divided by the total number of events forecasted (Trainor et al. 2015; Lim
66 et al. 2019). Similarly, missed events and MER were calculated based on
67 events that were not forecasted but did occur. A well-known consequence
68 of poor warning performance is the “cry wolf effect” or “false alarm ef-
69 fect” (Roulston and Smith 2004; Simmons and Sutter 2009; Trainor et al.
70 2015; Lim et al. 2019; LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Sawada et al. 2022). In this
71 phenomenon, people distrust subsequent warnings and hesitate to respond
72 because of their prior experience with false alarms. Improving forecasting
73 and warning performance is expected to reduce the abovementioned com-
74 placency of the public, encourage protective actions, and mitigate human
75 and property losses.

Table 1

76 In Japan, the performance of forecasts and warnings has been improv-
77 ing. For example, in July 2017, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA)
78 introduced a surface rainfall index and a refined basin rainfall index into
79 criteria for issuing flood warnings (Ota 2019). Through these efforts, the
80 percent correct (PC)¹ and probability of detection (POD)² of flood warn-
81 ings improved from 17% and 80%, respectively, in 2012 to 41% and 95%,
82 respectively, in 2017. Such improvements are expected to increase the trust

¹PC is calculated as the number of hits divided by the total number of events fore-
casted.

²POD is calculated as the number of hits divided by the total number of events that
occurred.

83 of local governments and residents in warnings, leading to a more accurate
84 issuance of evacuation information by local governments and the promotion
85 of proactive evacuation by residents (Ota 2019).

86 Does flood early warning system (FEWS) performance affect flood dam-
87 age in Japan? We aimed to answer this question; however, this is challeng-
88 ing because there are almost no open data on the history of warning hits
89 or misses in Japan, which makes it difficult to calculate FAR and MER.
90 However, exceptionally, data on the PC and POD of the “real-time flood
91 warning map” (*Kouzui Keihou no Kikendo Bunpu* or *Kouzui Kikikuru* in
92 Japanese) during the heavy rainfall in western Japan in 2018—the 2018
93 Japan Floods³—are presented in a technical document by the JMA (Ota
94 2019). The real-time flood warning map highlights the escalating risk of
95 flood disasters in small- and medium-sized rivers owing to heavy rainfall,
96 color-coded at five levels (Japan Meteorological Agency a). Based on these
97 PC and POD data, we made certain assumptions and calculated the FAR
98 and MER of flood warnings prior to the 2018 Japan Floods. We then focused
99 on the consequences of people’s failure to take protective actions—human
100 losses (i.e., the number of fatalities and injuries) and property losses (i.e.,
101 the number of economic losses)—during the 2018 Japan Floods in munic-

³It is identified by the Global IDentifier (GLIDE) number FL-2018-000082-JPN, avail-
able at <https://glidenumbers.net/glide/public/search/search.jsp>.

102 ipalities where flood warnings were issued. Using disaster statistical data
103 on human and property damage, we empirically analyzed the relationship
104 between pre-disaster warning performance and flood damage.

105 The present study’s findings underscore the social value of FEWS and
106 provide insights for designing a more effective FEWS. Revealing the effects
107 of the performance of FEWS—FAR and MER—on flood damage could help
108 demonstrate the social significance of improving warning performance. Ad-
109 ditionally, identifying the performance indicators that can be improved to
110 reduce particular types of damage can guide the development of more so-
111 cially beneficial technologies and systems.

112 **2. Literature Review**

113 *2.1 The effect of performance of EWS in the United States*

114 Past research has empirically studied the relationship between warning
115 performance, people’s protective actions, and the resulting disaster damage,
116 especially in the context of tornado warnings in the United States (U.S.).
117 For example, Simmons and Sutter (2009) conducted a statistical analysis of
118 the relationship between the FAR in tornado warnings and human casualties
119 caused by tornadoes (Simmons and Sutter 2009). Regression analyses were
120 conducted on over 20,000 tornadoes that occurred in the continental U.S.

121 between 1986 and 2004, using the tornado warning FAR as the explanatory
122 variable and the number of tornado fatalities and injuries as the outcome
123 variables. The results showed that the number of fatalities and injuries from
124 tornadoes was significantly higher in areas with a higher FAR.

125 The process by which warning performance influences protective actions,
126 which may result in tornado damage, has also been explored. Ripberger et
127 al. (2015) focused not only on FAR but also on MER, and examined their
128 effects on people's perceptions of tornado warnings and trust in the agency
129 responsible for issuing tornado warnings by conducting an online survey of
130 residents in tornado-prone areas in the U.S. (Ripberger et al. 2015). The
131 results indicate that residents in areas with higher actual FAR and MER
132 perceived higher FAR and MER, respectively. The results also indicated
133 that residents with higher perceived FAR and MER had less trust in the
134 National Weather Service (NWS), the agency responsible for issuing tornado
135 warnings, and respondents with less trust in the NWS were less willing to
136 take action in response to future warnings. This suggests that residents in
137 areas with higher actual FAR and MER may be less likely to take protective
138 action in response to future warnings.

139 Trainor et al. (2015) analyzed the relationship between actual and per-
140 ceived FAR and their effects on actual protective actions during tornado
141 warnings (Trainor et al. 2015). The results of the analysis of data collected

142 through telephone interviews with residents indicated that actual FAR had
143 no significant effect on residents' perceived FAR, whereas actual FAR had a
144 significant negative effect on taking protective actions (e.g., evacuation, in-
145 formation gathering, and property protection). This suggests that residents
146 in areas with high actual FAR may be less likely to take protective action
147 in response to warnings, even though they are not aware of the actual FAR.

148 In contrast, Lim et al. (2019) reported different findings (Lim et al.
149 2019). Their analysis of survey data from residents in the southeastern U.S.,
150 where most tornado fatalities occur in the country, found no significant
151 correlation between actual and perceived FAR, and actual FAR did not
152 significantly affect protective actions. However, residents with a higher
153 perceived FAR were more likely to take actions such as taking shelter when
154 a warning was issued.

155 Overall, while previous studies reported mixed results, they consistently
156 analyzed how the performance of warnings—actual FAR and MER—affects
157 protective actions and the resulting damage, considering factors such as
158 public perception of and trust in warnings. However, these findings for
159 tornadoes in the U.S. may not necessarily apply to floods in Japan given
160 the differences in disaster characteristics and false alarm frequencies. For
161 example, the FAR for tornado warnings in the U.S. was approximately
162 75% (Simmons and Sutter 2009), whereas the FAR for flood warnings in

163 Japan was 59% in 2018 (Ota 2019). The effects of warning performance
164 on protective actions may vary depending on the frequency of false alarms,
165 hazard types, and disaster impacts.

166 *2.2 The effect of performance of EWS in Japan*

167 Studies of the effects of warnings and evacuation advisory performance
168 on protective actions and disaster damage in Japan are limited. For ex-
169 ample, Yoshii et al. (2008) and Kaziya et al. (2018) conducted question-
170 naire surveys and interviews with residents for whom tsunami warnings
171 and evacuation advisories/instructions for landslides had been issued mul-
172 tiple times over a certain period (Yoshii et al. 2008; Kaziya et al. 2018).
173 These studies qualitatively pointed out that one reason why residents did
174 not evacuate when a relevant warning or evacuation advisory/instruction
175 was subsequently issued was the perception of previous warnings or advi-
176 sories/instructions as false alarms.

177 However, few statistical studies have been conducted. Okumura et al.
178 (2001) defined the subjective reliance on evacuation warnings as the proba-
179 bility that residents will suffer damage after receiving an evacuation advisory
180 (Okumura et al. 2001). A questionnaire survey was conducted on the level
181 of willingness to take evacuation action (evacuating immediately, preparing
182 for evacuation, staying at home, etc.) of residents affected by the landslide

183 disaster of the 1999 Hiroshima torrential rainfall under hypothetical disaster
184 information provision. The results showed that the subjective probability
185 significantly decreased when the evacuation advisory was a false alarm but
186 increased when the advisory was a hit or missed event. Furthermore, it was
187 shown that residents with higher subjective probability were more willing
188 to evacuate. Therefore, it was suggested that false alarms reduce the sub-
189 jective probability and, consequently, make residents less likely to evacuate.

190 Oikawa and Katada (2016) conducted experiments on warning strategies
191 and people's protective actions (Oikawa and Katada 2016). Based on the
192 basic policy of "issuing evacuation advisories as early as possible without
193 considering false alarms" (the guidelines for evacuation advisories issued by
194 the Cabinet Office in 2014), they conducted an experiment to test the ef-
195 fects of two types of warning strategies on the decision to evacuate: (1) a
196 low-frequency strategy prioritizing the avoidance of false alarms, and (2) a
197 high-frequency strategy prioritizing the avoidance of missed events. The re-
198 sults showed that, in the short term, the high-frequency strategy increased
199 evacuation rates, whereas the low-frequency strategy decreased them. How-
200 ever, in the long term, the effectiveness of both strategies was diminished,
201 and the absence of an evacuation advisory in the high-frequency strategy
202 significantly influenced the decision to not evacuate. The authors concluded
203 that while high-frequency strategies might be effective in the short term,

204 their long-term significance is limited.

205 However, these studies were conducted under hypothetical or experi-
206 mental conditions, and their findings have not been empirically validated
207 in actual disaster scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical
208 analyses have explored the relationship between warning performance and
209 actual protective actions or the resulting damage in Japan.

210 This study contributes to the literature by focusing on flood warnings in
211 Japan and statistically analyzing how their performance affects actual flood
212 damage. Building on Simmons and Sutter (2009), we performed regression
213 analyses using warning performance as the explanatory variable and flood
214 damage as the outcome variable. For the flood warning performance and
215 flood damage data, we utilized the open data described in Section 3. Unlike
216 Simmons and Sutter (2009), who considered only FAR, we included MER,
217 drawing on the approaches of Ripberger et al. (2015) and Okumura et al.
218 (2001). Additionally, whereas Simmons and Suter (2009) primarily focused
219 on human casualties, we considered a broader range of protective actions⁴
220 and examine the resulting economic losses to general assets and crops.

⁴Representative measures include using sandbags and waterproof boards to protect houses from flooding as well as moving assets (e.g., vehicles) to higher ground before flooding occurs.

221 3. Data

222 3.1 *Target flood and municipalities*

223 This study focuses on the damage caused by the 2018 Japan Floods, for
224 which the PC and POD of a real-time flood warning map were published by
225 Ota (2019). During the 2018 Japan Floods, river overflows and mudslides
226 occurred simultaneously in a wide area centered in western Japan from June
227 28 to July 8, 2018, owing to heavy rains caused by Typhoon Prapiroon and a
228 rainy season front (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
229 2019). This caused more than 700 casualties (Fire and Disaster Manage-
230 ment Agency 2019) and economic losses of approximately 1.2154 trillion yen
231 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 2018a), making
232 it the “worst flood disaster of the Heisei Era” (The Nikkei 2018).

233 The unit of analysis in this study is the municipalities within the four
234 prefectures with a large number of damaged rivers during the 2018 Japan
235 Floods: (1) Okayama, (2) Hiroshima, (3) Ehime, and (4) Fukuoka Prefec-
236 tures. The focus on these prefectures is due to the availability of PC and
237 POD data from Ota (2019). All municipalities within these four prefectures
238 received flood warnings during the heavy rainfall in the 2018 Japan Floods
239 (from June 28 to July 8, 2018) (Japan Meteorological Agency e). This al-
240 lows for an analysis of how people responded to the flood warnings and the

241 extent of the resulting damage. The final sample for analysis included 127
242 municipalities ($n = 127$), after excluding three municipalities from the 130
243 municipalities in the prefectures for the reasons discussed in Section 3.3b.

244 3.2 *Outcome variables*

245 As the outcome variables for the regression analyses, this study focused
246 on four types of flood damage in each municipality that could be obtained
247 from official statistics: the numbers of (1) fatalities [persons], (2) injuries
248 [persons], (3) economic losses to general assets⁵ (general assets and business
249 interruption losses) (hereafter, simply “economic losses (general assets)”)
250 [thousands of yen], and (4) economic losses to general assets (crops) (here-
251 after, “economic losses (crops)”) [thousands of yen]. By analyzing these four
252 outcome variables, the study could determine which types of damage were
253 affected by the performance of flood warnings. Data on the numbers of (1)
254 fatalities and (2) injuries in each municipality were derived from technical
255 disaster damage reports compiled by the prefectures (Hiroshima Prefecture
256 2018; Fukuoka Prefecture 2019; Okayama Prefecture 2020; Ehime Prefec-

⁵“Economic losses to general assets” include physical damage to buildings, household goods, business assets, and crops, as well as losses due to business interruptions (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 2018b).

257 ture 2023) and the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office 2019)⁶. The data for the
258 (3) economic losses (general assets) and (4) economic losses (crops) for each
259 municipality were based on a statistical survey of flood damage related to
260 the 2018 Japan Floods (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
261 Tourism 2018b). The distributions of each outcome variable are shown in
262 Fig. 1, and the descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A. As can
263 be seen from the figure, each variable is mostly concentrated at zero, the
264 distribution of which is left-skewed; that is, most municipalities experienced
265 no damage, but others experienced much greater damage.

Fig. 1

⁶These reports compiled by the prefectures show the numbers of deaths and injuries due to direct disaster damage at the municipal level, but do not distinguish between those caused by river overflows and those caused by landslides. On the other hand, the data from the Cabinet Office disclose the number of deaths and injuries due to landslide disasters at the municipal level. In this study, the number of deaths and injuries due to landslides at the municipal level based on the Cabinet Office data was subtracted from the number of deaths and injuries due to direct disaster-related deaths at the municipal level based on the data from each prefecture, and these resulting figures were considered as the number of (1) deaths and (2) injuries due to floods in each municipality.

266 *3.3 Explanatory variables*

267 *a. FAR and MER*

268 The FAR [%] and MER [%] of flood warnings before the 2018 Japan
269 Floods for each municipality were based on Ota (2019), where the PC [%]
270 and POD [%] of the real-time flood warning map during the 2018 Japan
271 Floods were published. Ota (2019) compiled the damage occurrence and
272 level of flood warnings for each river during the 2018 Japan Floods and
273 calculated the PC and POD for each prefecture. For example, as illustrated
274 in Table 2, the PC and POD for each prefecture were obtained for the level
275 of “Warning (Red)” (Level 3), which requires evacuation preparations and
276 the prompt commencement of evacuation for the elderly. From these PC
277 and POD figures, the FAR and MER for each prefecture can be calculated
278 using Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively.

Table 2

$$\text{FAR} = 100 - \text{PC} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{MER} = 100 - \text{POD} \quad (2)$$

279 In this study, we made the following three major assumptions to derive
280 the FAR and MER of flood warnings for each municipality before the 2018
281 Japan Floods from the PC and POD of each prefecture during the 2018
282 Japan Floods published by Ota (2019).

283 • **Assumption 1:** The performance of flood warnings for each mu-
284 nicipality is consistent with the performance of the warnings corre-
285 sponding to the “Warning (Red)” level in the real-time flood warning
286 map⁷.

287 • **Assumption 2:** The performance of warnings corresponding “Warn-
288 ing (Red)” level of real-time flood warning map at the time of the
289 2018 Japan Floods is representative of warning performance before
290 the floods⁸.

⁷In Japan, five levels have been set to provide an intuitive understanding of the level of a disaster and the actions to be taken. At Alert Level 3, people are expected to check hazard maps, prepare for evacuation, and in some cases voluntarily evacuate (Japan Meteorological Agency, d). Warnings associated with Level 3 are aimed to be issued several hours before the expected event (Japan Meteorological Agency, d). Flood warnings issued for each municipality and the warnings corresponding to the “Warning (Red)” level in the real-time flood warning map fall under the same Level 3. Therefore, we assumed that they had similar performance.

⁸Many factors that affect the performance of flood forecasting are river-specific. For example, river-specific infrastructure and conditions (e.g., “dams,” “weirs,” “diversion and spillways,” “environmental changes due to renovation,” “backwaters,” and “extremely small watersheds”) account for a large proportion of the factors that are assumed to contribute to the reduced performance of forecasts (according to the presentation “Current Status and Issues of Hazard Distribution (Kikikuru) from the Viewpoint of IBF [IBF no Kanten de Miru Kikendo Bunpu (Kikikuru) no Genjo to Kadai]” by Takuma Ota of the Meteorological Research Institute, JMA, at the 2023 Spring Conference of the Mete-

291 • **Assumption 3:** The performance of flood warnings issued for each
292 municipality does not differ significantly within the same prefecture.

293 Based on these assumptions, the FAR and MER of flood warnings issued
294 in each municipality before the 2018 Japan Floods are assumed to be the
295 same as those corresponding to the “Warning (Red)” level for each prefec-
296 ture in the real-time flood warning map, as reported in Ota (2019). Thus,
297 the FAR and MER values for each prefecture in Table 2 were used in the
298 analysis as the FAR and MER for the municipalities within each prefecture.

299 *b. Basin rainfall index criterion*

300 Selecting appropriate confounding variables for which to control is cru-
301 cial for reliable causal inference. Variables that influence both the cause
302 and outcome should be included as explanatory variables in the model to
303 minimize omitted variable bias (VanderWeele 2019). As the primary objec-
304 tive of the regression analysis in this study was to estimate the effects of
305 the FAR and MER of flood warnings on the damage (outcome variables), it
306 was important to control for confounding factors that influence both warn-
307 ing performance and flood damage.

orological Society of Japan). Since these factors do not change significantly in the short term, we assumed the performance of warnings at the time of the 2018 Japan Floods to be strongly correlated with that before the floods.

308 This study took the basin rainfall index criterion (*Ryūiki Uryō Shisū*
309 *Kijun* in Japanese) [.] as a primary confounding factor. The basin rainfall
310 index criterion or the combination of the surface rainfall index and basin
311 rainfall index has been established for each municipality as the issuance cri-
312 terion for flood warnings (Japan Meteorological Agency b). Lower criteria
313 may result in more frequent warnings, potentially increasing the number of
314 false alarms. Therefore, the basin rainfall index criterion was considered to
315 be correlated with the warning performance (FAR and MER). In addition,
316 the basin rainfall index criterion reflects, to some extent, the conditions of
317 levees and other infrastructure (Japan Meteorological Agency c). For exam-
318 ple, areas with advanced infrastructure tend to have a higher basin rainfall
319 index criterion. Flooding is less likely to occur in these areas, resulting in
320 reduced flood damage. In other words, the basin rainfall index criterion is
321 also considered to be correlated with flood damage. Thus, the basin rainfall
322 index criterion can influence both the performance of flood warnings (FAR
323 and MER) and the extent of flood damage (outcome variables).

324 The basin rainfall index criteria for all the municipalities used in this
325 analysis were obtained from the JMA’s list of criteria for issuing warnings
326 (Japan Meteorological Agency b). When a municipality had multiple basins
327 and more than one criterion, the median value of the criteria was used.
328 Due to the absence of basin rainfall index criteria, three municipalities—(1)

329 Kamijima-cho, Ehime Prefecture; (2) Ikata-cho, Ehime Prefecture; and (3)
330 Oto-machi, Fukuoka Prefecture—were excluded from the analysis. Descrip-
331 tive statistics for the basin rainfall index criteria are provided in Appendix
332 A.

333 *c. Other variables*

334 In addition to the basin rainfall index criteria, the following five vari-
335 ables were included as explanatory variables: (1) flooded area (residential
336 land and others) [m²], (2) flooded area (farmland) [m²], (3) population [per-
337 sons], (4) percentage of population over 65 years old [%], (5) sex ratio⁹ [.]
338 for each municipality. Covariate control recommends that variables that
339 influence the cause (i.e., FAR and MER) or outcome (i.e., flood damage)
340 should also be included as explanatory variables in the regression analy-
341 ses (VanderWeele 2019). Previous studies have indicated that the scale of
342 hazards and local population density have significant positive effects on the
343 number of fatalities and injuries (Simmons and Sutter 2009). Additionally,
344 age and gender have been found to significantly influence the protective ac-
345 tions taken when a warning is issued (Trainor et al. 2015; Lim et al. 2019).
346 Based on these findings, the aforementioned five variables were selected.

347 Data for these variables were sourced from public records. Specifically,

⁹The sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females.

348 (1) flooded area (residential land and others) [m²] and (2) flooded area
349 (farmland) [m²] in each municipality were obtained from the disaster statis-
350 tics (i.e., Flood Damage Statistics Survey in 2018) (Ministry of Land, In-
351 frastructure, Transport and Tourism 2018b); (3) population [persons], (4)
352 percentage of population over 65 years old [%], and (5) sex ratio [.] in
353 each municipality were taken from the 2015 Census (Ministry of Internal
354 Affairs and Communications 2017). Descriptive statistics for these vari-
355 ables are provided in Appendix A. The maximum correlation between the
356 explanatory variables was approximately 0.45 in absolute value, which is
357 well below the 0.80–0.95 threshold typically associated with multicollinear-
358 ity (Matsuura 2022), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in
359 this analysis.

360 4. Regression Models

361 This study employed two types of regression models tailored to the na-
362 ture of the outcome variables, which were either discrete or continuous data
363 with non-negative values: For the discrete variable—(1) fatalities and (2)
364 injuries—we used zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models as de-
365 scribed in Section 4.1; for the continuous variables—(3) economic losses
366 (general assets) and (4) economic losses (crops)—we used the hurdle logn-
367 normal (HL) model as detailed in Section 4.2.

368 The dataset in this study is nested, with each municipality (the unit of
369 analysis) belonging to a specific prefecture. This nested structure may intro-
370 duce group differences due to prefecture-level factors that are not captured
371 by the municipal-level explanatory variables alone (Snijders and Bosker
372 2011; Matsuura 2022). For instance, variations in disaster management sys-
373 tems across prefectures can lead to such differences. To account for these
374 potential group differences, we employed two versions of each model: (1)
375 without and (2) with prefecture dummy variables (referred to as “Model 1”
376 and “Model 2,” respectively)¹⁰. The use of multiple models enabled us to
377 verify the robustness of the results and make comparisons.

378 *4.1 Zero-inflated negative binomial models*

379 The variables representing fatalities and injuries contain many zeros and
380 exhibit overdispersion, as described in Section 3.2, thus making the ZINB
381 model appropriate. The ZINB model assumes a two-step data generation
382 process. In the first process, a sample has a probability $1 - q$ of being 0
383 ($y = 0$), and in the second process, a sample has a probability q of following

¹⁰Although a random intercept model could also be used to account for group differ-
ences as random effects, the dummy variable approach is recommended when the number
of groups ($N < 10$) is small (Snijders and Bosker 2011). In fact, random intercept models
were estimated, but the parameter estimates related to the random effects were unstable.
Therefore, only Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in this paper.

384 a negative binomial distribution. This two-step process effectively handles
 385 data with an excess of zeros. In addition, a negative binomial distribution is
 386 appropriate for overdispersed count data because it accounts for heterogene-
 387 ity in the mean parameter of the Poisson distribution (Cameron and Trivedi
 388 2005; Simmons and Sutter 2009). In this case study, the probability q rep-
 389 resents whether a flood hazard occurs in a municipality (the first process),
 390 and next, the likelihood of deaths or injuries is captured (the possibility of
 391 no deaths or injuries is also considered) when the hazard occurs (the second
 392 process). The probability mass function for the outcome variable y is as
 393 follows:

$$\text{ZINB}(y|q, \mu, \theta) = \begin{cases} 1 - q + q \cdot \text{NB}(0|\mu, \theta) & \text{if } y = 0, \\ q \cdot \text{NB}(y|\mu, \theta) & \text{if } y > 1. \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

$\text{NB}(y|\mu, \theta)$ is a negative binomial distribution with mean μ and variance
 $\mu + \mu^2/\theta$, and $\theta (> 0)$ is the dispersion parameter. The negative binomial
 probability mass function is given by

$$\text{NB}(y|\mu, \theta) = \frac{\Gamma(\theta + y)}{\Gamma(\theta)\Gamma(y + 1)} \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta + \mu}\right)^\theta \left(\frac{\mu}{\theta + \mu}\right)^y, \quad (4)$$

394 where Γ is the gamma function. In this study, the probability q of hazard
 395 occurrence was simplified to follow a Bernoulli process, while the mean μ
 396 of $\text{NB}(y|\mu, \theta)$, which is primarily related to the amount of damage, was
 397 regressed on the explanatory variables.

398 a. *Model 1: Without prefecture dummies*

The first model does not consider prefecture-specific effects (i.e., no prefecture dummies), and is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln \mu_{ij} = & \ln x_{Population,ij} + \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{FAR,ij} \\
 & + \beta_2 x_{BasinRainfall,ij} + \beta_3 x_{FloodedResidential,ij} \\
 & + \beta_4 x_{FloodedFarmland,ij} + \beta_5 x_{Elderly,ij} + \beta_6 x_{Sex,ij}, \quad (5)
 \end{aligned}$$

399 where i denotes a municipality in prefecture j ; $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$ denote Okayama,
 400 Hiroshima, Ehime, and Fukuoka Prefectures, respectively. n_j is the num-
 401 ber of municipalities in Prefecture j , and $n = \sum_j^4 n_j$. $x_{Population,ij}$ is the
 402 population, $x_{FAR,ij}$ the FAR, $x_{BasinRainfall,ij}$ the basin rainfall index cri-
 403 terion, $x_{FloodedResidential,ij}$ the flooded area (residential land and others),
 404 $x_{FloodedFarmland,ij}$ the flooded area (farmland), $x_{Elderly,ij}$ the percentage of
 405 population over 65 years old, and $x_{Sex,ij}$ the sex ratio for Municipality i in
 406 Prefecture j . When examining the effect of the MER, we replace $x_{FAR,ij}$
 407 with $x_{MER,ij}$. The parameters β_k ($k = 0, \dots, 6$) are the intercept and coef-
 408 ficients of the explanatory variables, respectively. These parameters, along
 409 with q and θ , are to be estimated. The main focus is on the estimation of
 410 β_1 , the coefficient of FAR or MER. A positive β_1 indicates that a munici-
 411 pality with a higher FAR (or MER) has more fatalities or injuries. The first
 412 term $\ln x_{Population,ij}$ on the right side of Eq. (5) is an offset term that allows

413 the model to account for the number of fatalities or injuries relative to the
 414 population of each municipality (Christensen et al. 2010).

415 *b. Model 2: With prefecture dummies*

The second model includes prefecture-specific effects (i.e., prefecture dummies) and is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln \mu_{ij} = & \ln x_{Population,ij} + \beta_0 + \beta_{02}x_{Hiroshima} + \beta_{03}x_{Ehime} + \beta_{04}x_{Fukuoka} \\
 & + \beta_1x_{FAR,ij} + \beta_2x_{BasinRainfall,ij} + \beta_3x_{FloodedResidential,ij} \\
 & + \beta_4x_{FloodedFarmland,ij} + \beta_5x_{Elderly,ij} + \beta_6x_{Sex,ij}. \tag{6}
 \end{aligned}$$

416 This model includes the additional terms $\beta_{02}x_{Hiroshima}$, $\beta_{03}x_{Ehime}$, $\beta_{04}x_{Fukuoka}$
 417 in Eq. (5) to account for prefecture-specific effects. The dummy variables
 418 $x_{Hiroshima}$, x_{Ehime} , and $x_{Fukuoka}$ take the value 1 if the municipality be-
 419 longs to Hiroshima, Ehime, or Fukuoka, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The
 420 parameters β_{0j} ($j = 2, 3, 4$), along with q and θ , are estimated.

421 *4.2 Hurdle lognormal model*

The economic losses (general assets) and economic losses (crops) are non-negative continuous data with many zeros, as shown in Section 3.2; thus, we used HL models, which are well-suited to these data characteristics (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Hamada et al. 2019). The HL models also assume a two-step data generation process. In the first process, a sample

has a probability $1 - q$ of being 0 ($y = 0$), and in the second process, a sample has a probability of q of following a lognormal distribution. This two-step process can represent data containing many zeros. In our case study, the probability of q represents whether a flood hazard occurs in a municipality (the first process), and the economic losses then always arise ($y > 0$) when the hazard occurs (the second process). The probability density function for the outcome variable y is as follows:

$$\text{HL}(y|q, \mu, \sigma) = \begin{cases} 1 - q & \text{if } y = 0, \\ q \cdot \text{Lognormal}(y|\mu, \sigma) & \text{if } y > 0. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

422 Lognormal($y|\mu, \sigma$) represents the probability density function for the lognor-
 423 mal distribution, where $\ln y$ follows a normal distribution with mean μ and
 424 standard deviation σ . As in Section 4.1, the mean μ of Lognormal($y|\mu, \sigma$)
 425 was regressed on the explanatory variables using Models 1 and 2.

426 *a. Model 1: Without prefecture dummies*

The first model, without prefecture dummies, is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \mu_{ij} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{FAR,ij} + \beta_2 x_{BasinRainfall,ij} + \beta_3 x_{FloodedResidential,ij} \\ & + \beta_4 x_{FloodedFarmland,ij} + \beta_5 x_{Elderly,ij} + \beta_6 x_{Sex,ij} + \beta_7 x_{Population,ij}. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

427 The parameters β_k ($k = 0, \dots, 7$), q , and σ are estimated.

428 *b. Model 2: With prefecture dummies*

The second model, with prefecture dummies, is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \mu_{ij} = & \beta_0 + \beta_{02}x_{Hiroshima} + \beta_{03}x_{Ehime} + \beta_{04}x_{Fukuoka} \\ & + \beta_1x_{FAR,ij} + \beta_2x_{BasinRainfall,ij} + \beta_3x_{FloodedResidential,ij} \\ & + \beta_4x_{FloodedFarmland,ij} + \beta_5x_{Elderly,ij} + \beta_6x_{Sex,ij} + \beta_7x_{Population,ij}. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

429 The parameters β_{0j} ($j = 2, 3, 4$), β_k ($k = 0, \dots, 7$), q , and σ are estimated.

430 *4.3 Bayesian estimation*

431 *a. Overview of estimation*

432 We employed a Bayesian approach to estimate the models. This method
433 treats parameters as random variables. Drawing on Bayes' theorem, the
434 prior probability distribution of unknown parameters, that is, the prior
435 distribution, is updated, given the data obtained, to a posterior distribu-
436 tion (Gelman et al. 2013; Lee and Wagenmakers 2013; Levy and Mislevy
437 2017; Matsuura 2022). That is, $p(\boldsymbol{\eta}|\mathbf{D}) \propto p(\mathbf{D}|\boldsymbol{\eta})p(\boldsymbol{\eta})$, where $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ is an
438 unknown parameter vector, \mathbf{D} is data, $p(\boldsymbol{\eta})$ is a prior distribution of the
439 parameters, $p(\mathbf{D}|\boldsymbol{\eta})$ is a likelihood, and $p(\boldsymbol{\eta}|\mathbf{D})$ is a posterior distribution.
440 In most instances, the posterior distribution, which expresses the uncer-
441 tainty of the parameters, is obtained by simulation using so-called Markov

442 chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Sampling-based Bayesian methods
 443 depend less on asymptotic theory, and therefore have the potential to pro-
 444 duce more reliable results, even with small samples, than those obtained
 445 by the maximum likelihood method (Song and Lee 2012; Van De Schoot
 446 et al. 2017). Our data are from only four prefectures; thus, the sample
 447 is not large, which justifies the use of the Bayesian method. Furthermore,
 448 the Bayesian method is more flexible with complex datasets and model-
 449 ing (Hamada et al. 2019; Kruschke 2021). As our analysis incorporates
 450 zero-inflated and hurdle processes (as shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2), the
 451 Bayesian approach is considered suitable.

452 *b. Prior distributions*

In the estimation, we used noninformative and weakly informative priors as follows:

$$\beta_k \sim \text{Normal}(0, 10) \tag{10}$$

$$\beta_{0j} \sim \text{Normal}(0, 10) \tag{11}$$

$$q \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 1) \tag{12}$$

$$\theta \sim \text{Gamma}(1, 1) \tag{13}$$

$$\sigma \sim \text{Normal}^+(0, 5) \tag{14}$$

453 where Uniform(0, 1) is a continuous uniform distribution on the interval
 454 [0, 1]. Gamma(1, 1) is a gamma distribution whose density function is

455 Gamma ($\theta|a = 1, b = 1$) = $b^a\theta^{a-1} \exp(-b\theta)/\Gamma(a)$ with mean a/b and stan-
456 dard deviation $\sqrt{a/b}$. Normal⁺(0, 5) is a normal distribution with a mean
457 of 0 and a standard deviation of 5, truncated to positive values. Eq. (11)
458 was used only for Model 2; Eq. (13) was only applied to ZINB models, and
459 Eq. (14) was applicable only to HL models.

460 *c. Computations*

461 We conducted a Bayesian estimation using the Stan program (Carpenter
462 et al. 2017) using RStan (Stan Development Team). We ran the MCMC
463 with 16,000 iterations, following a burn-in of 1000 iterations for each of the
464 four chains, and every fifth iteration was saved for each chain. We drew
465 12,000 ($= (16,000 - 1000) \times 4 \div 5$) samples for each parameter.

466 Before running the simulation, we transformed the data to ease the con-
467 vergence (Matsuura 2022) as follows: the FAR, MER, percentage of popu-
468 lation over 65 years, and sex ratio were divided by 100. The flooded area
469 (residential land and others), flooded area (farmland), and basin rainfall
470 index criteria were standardized. The population was standardized only for
471 HL models.

472 When estimating the posterior distribution of the parameters of each
473 model, the models were evaluated using the WAIC (Watanabe-Akaike in-
474 formation criterion or widely applicable information criterion). The WAIC

475 approximates the generalization loss (roughly speaking, the closeness be-
476 tween the true distribution of data and the predictive distribution gener-
477 ated by the model) (Gelman et al. 2013; Hamada et al. 2019; Matsuura
478 2022). The smaller the WAIC, the better the model in terms of a smaller
479 generalization loss. To estimate WAIC, we used the *loo* package (Gabry
480 2024).

481 The MCMC chains were checked in terms of convergence and resolu-
482 tion. Specifically, model convergence was assessed using the Gelman-Rubin
483 statistic (Gelman and Rubin 1992). In the following estimation, all param-
484 eters reached statistical values lower than the recommended value of 1.1.
485 Posterior samples should be less autocorrelated and the effective sample size
486 (ESS)¹¹ should be sufficient to obtain stable parameter estimates, particu-
487 larly for the stable limits of credible intervals (Kruschke 2014, 2021). The
488 ESS of each parameter exceeded the recommended value of 10,000.

489 5. Results

490 The estimation results for the posterior distributions of the FAR and
491 MER parameters for each outcome variable—the (1) fatalities, (2) injuries,
492 (3) economic losses (general assets), and (4) economic losses (crops)—are

¹¹The ESS is the effective number of steps in the MCMC chain after the clumpiness of autocorrelation is factored out.

493 presented in Sections 5.1 through 5.4, respectively. Detailed results for
494 the posterior distributions, including other parameters, are provided in the
495 Supplementary Materials.

496 5.1 *Fatalities*

497 Figure 2a displays the posterior distribution of the parameter β_1 for the
498 FAR, along with the WAIC for each model; Fig. 2b shows the same for the
499 MER. The vertical axis in each figure represents the model number. Each
500 posterior distribution is depicted with the posterior mean in a circle and
501 the 90% highest density interval (HDI)¹² on a line.

502 A positive trend was observed for FAR in Model 1, where the 90% HDI
503 did not overlap with 0, and the probability that the parameter was positive
504 was extremely high ($\Pr(\beta_1 > 0) = 0.997$). This suggests that municipalities
505 with higher FAR experienced more fatalities. However, in Model 2, the 90%
506 HDI overlapped with 0, and the distribution was widely spread over both
507 positive and negative values. When comparing the WAIC of the models,
508 Model 1 had a lower value, indicating that it was more credible from the
509 WAIC perspective.

¹²The 90% HDI summarizes the distribution by specifying an interval that spans most of the distribution, say 90%, such that every point inside the interval has a higher credibility than any point outside it (Kruschke 2014).

510 In contrast, the posterior distribution for MER was centered around 0
511 in both models, implying that there is no strong evidence to suggest that
512 MER has a substantial effect on the number of fatalities.

Fig. 2

513 5.2 Injuries

514 A positive trend in FAR was also observed in Model 1 for injuries
515 (Fig. 3a). The 90% HDI for Model 1 did not overlap with 0, and the
516 probability that the parameter was positive was extremely high ($\Pr(\beta_1 >$
517 $0) = 0.999$). This suggests that municipalities with higher FAR experienced
518 more injuries. However, in Model 2, the 90% HDI overlapped with 0, and
519 the distribution was widely spread over positive and negative values. More-
520 over, the WAIC for Model 2 was smaller, indicating that the results from
521 Model 1 may be less reliable when considering WAIC. Therefore, the effect
522 of FAR on the number of injuries should be interpreted with caution.

523 For the MER parameter, a negative trend was observed in Model 1
524 (Fig. 3b), suggesting that a higher MER may be associated with fewer
525 injuries. However, Model 2, which had a posterior distribution centered
526 around 0 and a smaller WAIC, indicated that this negative association
527 should be interpreted cautiously.

Fig. 3

528 *5.3 Economic losses (general assets)*

529 For economic losses (general assets), a positive trend was observed for
530 the FAR parameter in both models (Fig. 4a). In Model 1, the 90% HDI
531 did not overlap with 0, and the probability that the parameter was positive
532 was extremely high ($\Pr(\beta_1 > 0) = 1.000$). Although Model 2 showed a 90%
533 HDI overlap with 0, the probability that the parameter was positive was still
534 high ($\Pr(\beta_1 > 0) = 0.788$). A positive parameter means that municipalities
535 with higher FAR suffered greater economic losses (general assets). However,
536 Model 2 had a lower WAIC, suggesting that the results of Model 1 should
537 be considered with caution.

538 For the MER parameter, the posterior distribution in Model 1 showed
539 a negative trend, but Model 2 had a widely spread distribution centered
540 around 0 with a smaller WAIC (Fig. 4b). These results suggest that there
541 is no strong evidence for a positive effect of MER on economic losses (general
542 assets).

Fig. 4

543 *5.4 Economic losses (crops)*

544 Although positive trends were observed for both FAR and MER parame-
545 ters regarding economic losses (crops), these effects were not as pronounced
546 as those observed for the other outcome variables (Fig. 5). The 90% HDIs
547 for both models overlapped with 0, and the posterior means were close to

548 0, indicating that neither FAR nor MER had a strong or clear effect on
549 economic losses (crops). Of the variables examined, the effect of FAR on
550 general losses (crops) appeared to be the weakest.

Fig. 5

551 6. Discussion and Conclusions

552 Frequent false alarms or missed events may erode public trust in warn-
553 ings and their issuers, potentially leading to a decreased likelihood of pro-
554 tective action in response to future warnings, thereby increasing disaster
555 damage. In this study, we used limited open data on FAR and MER in
556 Japan to analyze their effects on human and property damage at the mu-
557 nicipal level during the 2018 Japan Floods, employing Bayesian statistical
558 models. We discuss which types of damage are associated with FAR and
559 MER (Section 6.1) and suggest measures for improving the effectiveness of
560 FEWS (Section 6.2).

561 6.1 *Effect of FAR and MER*

562 The results in Section 5 suggest that we cannot deny the possibility that
563 higher FAR increases several types of flood damage. Specifically, Model 1
564 in Figs. 2a, 3a, and 4a suggests that FAR may be associated with higher (1)
565 fatalities, (2) injuries, and (3) economic losses (general assets), as indicated
566 by the 90% HDI of the posterior distribution, which does not overlap with

567 0. However, in Model 2, which included prefecture-specific effects, such as
568 disaster management systems, the influence of FAR was less pronounced.
569 The posterior distribution of the FAR parameter in Model 2 is positively
570 skewed for (3) economic losses (general assets) (Fig. 4a), but none of the
571 posterior distributions show a strong positive trend, in that their 90% HDIs
572 do not overlap with 0 (Figs. 2a and 3a). Additionally, Model 2 showed a
573 lower WAIC than Model 1 for both injuries and economic losses (general
574 assets), suggesting that the effects of FAR on these two outcomes should be
575 interpreted with caution.

576 The finding that FAR is associated with the number of fatalities aligns
577 with that of Simmon and Sutter (2009), who studied tornado warnings
578 in the U.S. It is also consistent with previous studies (Ripberger et al.
579 2015; Trainor et al. 2015) that found that a higher FAR hampers protec-
580 tive actions in the future and during actual tornado warnings in the U.S.
581 This suggests that among the measures of performance of flood warnings,
582 the FAR is particularly strongly associated with life-saving behavior (e.g.,
583 evacuation).

584 Several reasons could explain why the FAR did not have as strong an
585 effect on the other variables. One possible reason is the “risk perception
586 paradox,” where higher risk perception does not necessarily lead to disas-
587 ter preparedness actions (Wachinger et al. 2013). Wachinger et al. (2013)

588 attributed this paradox to confusion or ignorance about the appropriate
589 actions to take and a lack of capacity and resources to help oneself. While
590 some of these factors were accounted for in this study (e.g., population over
591 65 years of age and sex ratio), there may be unmeasured effects that influ-
592 ence the outcomes. During the 2018 Japan Floods, even if people trusted
593 the warnings, they might not have had the ability or knowledge to act.

594 Other possible reasons could be the characteristics of flood warnings.
595 Flood warnings are issued when serious flooding is expected to occur, but
596 they do not explicitly instruct people on the actions they should take, unlike
597 evacuation orders (Yamori, 2016). Consequently, flood warnings might not
598 have been strongly associated with intentions related to protective actions
599 and might not have had significant effects on flood damage.

600 Conversely, MER did not show a positive association with the casualties
601 or economic losses (Figs. 2b–5b). A possible reason is the influence of past
602 disaster experiences in addition to the reasons mentioned above. Wachinger
603 et al. (2013) cite past disaster experience, in addition to trust in warnings,
604 as one factor that influences heightened risk perception. Municipalities with
605 more missed events may have suffered significant damage in the past, and
606 as a result, it can be inferred that residents had a higher risk perception,
607 and some residents took action when a warning was issued. Okumura et al.
608 (2001) also showed that when a missed event occurred, unlike in the case

609 of a false alarm, people increased their subjective reliance on evacuation
610 warnings and were more willing to take evacuation actions. The fact that
611 the posterior distribution of the MER parameter showed a negative trend
612 for some outcome variables (Model 1 for Figs. 3b and 4b) is consistent with
613 their findings. Therefore, we conclude that we obtained the result that
614 higher MER does not necessarily increase flood damage.

615 *6.2 Implication for effective FEWS*

616 Our findings suggest that issuing frequent warnings, which may result in
617 a large number of false alarms, can have negative consequences, as concluded
618 by Oikawa and Katada (2016) based on their experiments. One possible
619 mechanism is that frequent false alarms decrease people’s trust in warnings,
620 resulting in their reluctance to take protective action (e.g., evacuation) in
621 response to subsequent warnings. Therefore, a strategy issuing frequent
622 warnings must consider the adverse effects of false alarms on protection
623 actions and reduce such adverse effects. For example, LeClerc and Joslyn
624 (2015) suggested that providing information on probabilistic forecasts, in
625 addition to information on deterministic forecasts, may increase trust in and
626 responsiveness to weather information. In the context of floods in Japan,
627 offering probabilistic data may encourage residents to take protective action.

628 These findings also suggest that the development of technologies and

629 systems that contribute to reducing the FAR may be particularly effective
630 in reducing flood damage. Tanaka et al. (2008) and Ota (2019) discussed
631 the changes in the numbers of false alarms and missed events following the
632 introduction of new flood warning criteria in May 2008 and July 2017, re-
633 spectively (Tanaka et al. 2008; Ota 2019). Both studies demonstrated that
634 the new criteria based on the basin rainfall index and surface rainfall index
635 significantly reduced the number of false alarms, while largely maintain-
636 ing the number of missed events. In other words, the FAR reduction was
637 achieved without increasing the MER. Such improvements in warning cri-
638 teria are considered effective in reducing flood damage, especially fatalities,
639 and similar improvements in technologies and systems will be required in
640 the future.

641 *6.3 Limitations and future directions*

642 This study has several limitations. The first and most significant lim-
643 itation is the reliance on three major assumptions in calculating the FAR
644 and MER for each municipality, as discussed in Section 3.3a. These assump-
645 tions were made because of the limited availability of open data on FAR
646 and MER in Japan. Future work would benefit from more granular and
647 widely available data on false alarms and missed events at the municipal
648 and monthly levels, eliminating the need for such assumptions. Once more

649 detailed data become available, panel data analysis and other methods can
650 provide deeper insights into the effects of warning performance.

651 The second limitation is the study's focus on the direct relationship
652 between warning performance (FAR and MER) and flood damage without
653 explicitly analyzing the intervening processes. As discussed in Section 2, the
654 effects of FAR or MER on damage are likely to involve public perceptions of
655 and trust in warnings and issuers. Another possibility that has not been dis-
656 cussed extensively is the intervening influence of other stakeholders, such
657 as local governments. For example, municipalities experiencing frequent
658 false alarms (high FAR) might anticipate public reluctance to act and in-
659 crease efforts to encourage evacuation (e.g., call for evacuation), potentially
660 increasing individuals' protective actions and mitigating damage despite a
661 higher FAR. Future studies should explore these processes in greater detail.

662 The third limitation is the exclusive focus on flood warnings, as they
663 were issued for all municipalities during the 2018 Japan Floods. Analyzing
664 higher-level weather warnings (e.g., emergency warnings (*Tokubetsu Keihou*
665 in Japanese)) and directives for action (e.g., evacuation orders) could help
666 clarify which types of information are most effective in mitigating damage
667 and should be prioritized for improvement.

668 Despite these limitations, this study is the first to empirically examine
669 the effects of FAR and MER on flood damage in Japan, where open data

670 on flood warning performance are scarce. These findings provide useful in-
671 formation for warning providers and developers of weather forecasting and
672 warning systems, highlighting the potential disaster mitigation effects of
673 warning performance and the future direction of effective warning strate-
674 gies and system development. The study also underscores the importance
675 of making weather forecasting and warning data more openly available in
676 Japan, which could stimulate further research into weather forecasting and
677 warnings.

678 **Supplement** The supplementary material includes the estimation re-
679 sults (i.e., the summary of the posterior distributions of all the parameters
680 for each model).

681 **Data Availability Statement**

682 The dataset and codes for the analyses are available at [https://doi.](https://doi.org/xxxxxxx)
683 [org/xxxxxxx](https://doi.org/xxxxxxx). [The doi number is issued after the acceptance of the article.]

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691 A. Sample characteristics

692 The descriptive statistics for the outcome variables are presented in Ta-
693 ble 3, while the statistics of the data for the explanatory variables (excluding
694 FAR and MER) are shown in Table 4.

Table 3

Table 4

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


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


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


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


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


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Table 1. Warning performance typology

		Hazard forecasted	
		Yes	No
Hazard observed	Yes	Hit	Missed events
	No	False alarms	All clear

Table 2. PC and POD according to Ota (2019); FAR and MER used for this study

		Okayama	Hiroshima	Ehime	Fukuoka
Ota (2019)	PC [%]	23	21	13	40
	POD [%]	74	93	78	87
This study	FAR [%]	77	79	87	60
	MER [%]	26	7	22	13

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of outcome variables

	Mean	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
Fatalities [persons]	0.72	21.76	0	52
Injuries [persons]	2.70	140.35	0	120
Economic losses (general assets) [thousand yen]	5.91×10^6	5.74×10^{14}	0	239737892
Economic losses (crops) [thousand yen]	3.06×10^4	2.17×10^{10}	0	1288800

Table 4. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables

	Mean	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
Basin rainfall index criterion [.]	1.28×10	5.10×10	3.7	49.1
Flooded area (residential land and others) [m ²]	5.04×10^5	4.42×10^{12}	0	21084039
Flooded area (farmland) [m ²]	4.95×10^5	5.58×10^{12}	0	22850940
Population [persons]	8.84×10^4	4.29×10^{10}	866	1538681
Percentage of population over 65 years old [%]	3.22×10	4.08×10	16	49
Sex ratio [.]	9.05×10	1.45×10	82	106